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ARTICLE I.

KOREA IN ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA.

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THE nature of Korea's relations with China has for the last thirty years been a puzzle for western nations. Were they—with the ambiguous utterance of the Chinese government before them that "Korea, though a vassal and tributary state of China, was entirely independent so far as her government, religion and intercourse with foreign states were concerned"—to consider it as an integral part of the Chinese empire, or should they treat it as a sovereign state enjoying absolute international rights?

The problem was practically solved by the conclusion of the treaty between Japan, and later on the United States, and Korea, but this has not materially altered the nature of the relations existing for the last four centuries at least between China and its so-called vassal. That China has, however, derived profit from the opening of Korea to the commerce of nations, there can be no doubt, for she too, being at liberty to conclude treaties with Korea and open this new market to her merchants, has done so, like other nations, though she has chosen to call her treaty by the euphonious name of "Commercial and trade regulations for the subjects of China and Korea," and her diplomatic representative in Söul, "Minister Resident for political and commercial affairs."

What China's relations with Korea were prior to the opening of the latter kingdom by the treaty of 1883, I propose to show in the following pages, taking as my authorities official Chinese publications and writings of men in official position.

What does the investiture by China of the kings of Siam, Burmah, Annam, Korea, etc., amount to? To nothing more than the recognition of a weak sovereign by the most powerful state in Asia.* Take for example Burmah: we know as a matter of fact that the Chinese invasion of that country in 1769 was successfully repelled, and that the Chinese generals were forced to sue for peace. In the convention signed by them and the Burmese commissioners on December 13, 1769, it was agreed among other things that "letters of friendship were to be sent every ten years from one sovereign to another."† Let us turn now to the "Institutes of the Ta ch'ing dynasty," and we find it mentioned, for example, that in 1790 the king of Burmah sent an envoy to the Emperor with presents and a humble statement or *piao* (表), and asked him to confer on him a patent of investiture or *feng* (封). Such is the Chinese method of embellishing history!

In 1800 the same work tells us that the king of Burmah sent the Emperor a *piao* on gold leaf with the *regulation tribute*!

The Burmese "tribute" to China has been considered of such a purely ceremonial nature that the British government showed no hesitation, when concluding the recent Burmah convention with China by which the latter power agrees to the occupation of Upper Burmah by Great Britain, to guarantee the continuance of the decennial tribute mission to Peking. The tribute sent to Peking by all the "vassal states," and also by the Tibetans, and the Aboriginal tribes of Western China, is solely a *quid pro quo* for the privilege of trading with the Chinese under extraordinarily favorable conditions, the merchants and merchandise being brought to the market and returned home free of all charges.

Stress has been laid on the expression, used alike by Chinese and Koreans in official documents, which speaks of Korea as a *shu kuo* (屬國), generally translated in English by "vassal kingdom, fief," etc., but these expressions are misleading, for the character *shu* carries with it the idea of relationship, which is the key-note to the whole system of Korean dependency.

The reason why for so many generations Korea was closed to the outer world cannot be better given than in the communication which the king of Korea (or rather the T'ai-Wen Kun) addressed to the Board of Rites in Peking in 1871, from which I take the following passage: "I know that this is a petty state, a mere handful of earth lying on the remotest bound of the eastern sea, whose productions, revenue, soldiers, and arms are not to be compared to those of other nations; but

* See p. 18.

† See Sir Arthur P. Phayre, *History of Burma*, p. 202.

still our commonwealth is well ordered, and it depends on its own resources, which indeed is owing to the vast kindness of His Sacred Majesty's protection, reaching in its wide influence far off to us in these eastern seas. Its educated men observe and practice the teachings of Confucius and of King Wen; its common people cultivate pulse and millet, and get their wealth in silk and hemp; and thus studying frugality, in its poverty the country preserves its supplies, and its government reposes in safety on its own basis.

"Suppose that one day our people should have their eyes dazzled with the rare and novel things which should be brought here, or be deluded and vitiated by strange doctrines poured into their ears, they would then reject the old ways, change their usages and daily become more thriftless and unproductive; the waste of their means and misuse of their substance would continually approach utter exhaustion, till at last the best interests of people and government would be involved. Oh! what imminent danger!"

The translation which I have given of the Songpha inscription may be of interest. It is to be noted how closely the *Sheng-wu-chi's* version of the Manchu invasion of Korea is reproduced in the inscription; one might suppose that the same author had drawn up both accounts of these events.

The maps of Söul and the neighborhood of the capital are copies—better in execution than the originals, I must admit—of the official Korean map of those sections of the country.

For all Korean proper names I have given the Korean pronunciation of the Chinese characters used; other names are given with the Chinese northern mandarin pronunciation.

I.

In 1392 the Ministers of State of Korea reported to the Emperor T'ai-tsu of the Ming dynasty as follows: "Our much lamented sovereign having died without leaving issue, the powerful minister Ni In-in gave the sovereign rule to U the son of Sin-chun,* but he showed himself both stupid and fond

* The *Ming shih*, ch. 320, p. 3, gives another account of these events derived presumably from an independent source. It says that in 1370 Ni In-in killed Chyen, king of Korea, and put on the throne the king's adopted son U, the child of his favorite Sin-chun. In 1388 King U killed the son of Ni Söng-ké, who commanded at Pyöng-yang, whereat Ni attacked the capital and took the king prisoner. The king abdicated in favor of his son Ch'ang, but the Emperor of China would not recognize him. Söng-ké deposed him and put on the throne (or rather made regent) Wang Yö. Shortly after Söng-ké assumed the sovereign power himself, and sent Yö to live at Wön-ju in Kang-wön do, and with him ended the sovereignty of the Wang family, which had been on the throne of Korea ever since the epoch of the Five Dynasties in China.

of shedding blood. It happened that he wanted to send a military expedition to the border, but General Ni Söng-ké, disapproving of it, marched the troops back. U saw his error and, filled with terror, he abdicated in favor of his son Ch'ang. The people were opposed to this, and besought the queen of our lamented sovereign, who belonged to the An family, to select her relative Yo to manage the affairs of the state. After four years he also showed himself stupid and wicked, and, believing in calumnies, he grievously wounded the son of an officer of long established merit; now his son Syek being also a silly man without any ability, the people of the kingdom said 'Yo is unable to rule the gods of the land and grain,' and they caused the queen, belonging to the An family, to restore Yo to private life; and the Wang dynasty (lit. family) having no able representative, was at an end.

"The people both within and without the capital are devoted to Söng-ké, so the Ministers and the elders of the people have requested him to become their sovereign, and the Emperor's approval is asked."

"The Emperor said: 'Kao-li is a small region in the far east, and is not under the rule of the Middle Kingdom (非中國所治).^{*} Let the Board of Rites inform it that as long as its rule is in conformity with the will of Heaven and in harmony with the hearts of men and as long as it creates no strife on our borders, so long will its people be allowed to go and come and the kingdom will enjoy happiness; but we have no investigation to make in the matter (of the change of dynasty).'"

In the winter of the same year Söng-ké sent letters of condolence to the Emperor upon the death of the heir to the throne, and asked to change the name of the dynasty. The Emperor ordered that it should reassume its old name of *Chao-hsien*, "The calm of dawn."

The above is the official account of the founding of the dynasty which still rules Korea, as found in the "Annals of the Ming dynasty," book 320, p. 4 *et sq.*, and of the attitude taken by the ruler of China in regard to the revolution. The tacit recognition by China of the new dynasty in Korea was, however, a most important event, and fully justified its new ruler in continuing the relations previously existing with the Empire, and showing its ruler the dutifulness due from a son to a father. But besides getting from Korea simple marks of deference, the Emperors of the Ming derived profit from the valuable tribute

* China does not appear ever to have appreciated the full importance of such statements, and the inference which foreign nations must draw from it that Korea was an independent state. China has never, until recently, overstepped the bounds which this admission of Korea's right to self-government carried with it, and interfered in the management of the country.

which they exacted from the king in exchange for their friendship.

In 1393, Chōng-ké sent the Emperor 9800 and odd horses, 19,700 and odd pieces of hempen, linen and cotton stuffs. The same year he sent a second mission with presents of horses and requested that a new gold seal be given him.

In 1407, 3000 head of horses were sent to China; but on reaching Liao-tung, and at the request of the Board of Revenue, there were sent instead 15,000 pieces of cotton lustring.

In 1423, Ni-to sent the Emperor 10,000 head of horses, on asking for the recognition of his son as heir to his throne.

In 1450, Korea sent the Emperor 500 horses, and made apologies for not sending the 20,000 or 30,000 asked for by the Emperor.

Many other examples might be given to show the valuable nature of the gifts made by Korea to its powerful neighbor, but the above will amply suffice.

Of the commercial relations which existed between the two countries during the Ming dynasty (1368-1628), the books at my disposal hardly enable me to judge. We know, however, that the annual missions to China did the bulk of the trading, and that the rest was done at the periodical fairs at Wi-ju on the Yalu river. No trade by sea between China and Korea was allowed by the latter state, and all Chinese shipwrecked on its coasts were sent to China by the land route.

The help in men and money which China gave Korea during the Japanese invasion,* the cannon and powder with which it had supplied it as early as 1461, may be cited among the proofs of its recognition of Korea's devotion to it. But naturally the weaker power had, in the earlier days of its existence at least, to give much more than it received.

II.

(Extract from the "Military History" of the present dynasty.)†

A decree of the 45th year of K'ang-hsi (1706) says: "Chao-hsien is among the outer barbarians the country which approximates the closest to China in its literature and customs. When the Emperor T'ai-tsung-wen conquered in person that country, there was no spot throughout its eight provinces and its many islands where his troops did not penetrate. The kingdom was

* It must be admitted, however, that it is more than likely that China would never have helped Korea at this critical period, had it not feared that the Japanese, having subdued Korea, would overrun China. This is borne out by the account in the "Annals of the Ming dynasty."

† *Sheng wu chi*, (聖武記,) Book 6, p. 10 *et seq.* C. Imbault Huart published a translation of the greater part of this extract in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1879.

destroyed and brought to life again (through his bounty), and so the people of the country erected a commemorative tablet in stone at a place where the Emperor's headquarters had been, and his virtue is extolled to the present day.*

"They (the Koreans) are very deserving of praise. During the Ming period they never wavered in their allegiance, and from first to last they have never shown duplicity."

Great are these words of the Sovereign and how they should stimulate foreign nations to perpetual loyalty!

Chao-hsien is (the same as) Ching chou beyond the sea (mentioned in) the *Yü Kung*.† Shun divided it off as Ying chou, and during the Chou dynasty it was given as a fief to Chi-tzu. It was originally Chinese territory, and separated from Sheng-ching by the Yalu river.

In the 4th year of T'ien-ming, the Emperor T'ai-tsu-kao (1619), 200,000 of the Ming troops invaded (Manchuria) by four roads, and Korea sent General Kang Hong-ip with troops to assist the Hai and Kai divisions of the Ming army.‡ But while the two corps were encamped together at Pu-kö chal-pang,§ the winds suddenly shifted and sent down a deluge of rain which rendered the fire-arms of the Ming army useless, so that our troops overcame them, and captured Kang Hong-ip and 5000 men.

The Emperor sent General Kang and ten others back to the king of Korea, Ni-hu, with a letter in which he said: "Formerly the Ming assisted you with troops (in your troubles with the Japanese), so it was only natural that you should assist the Ming with your soldiers, but it is not out of enmity for us. Now I send your general and your officers back to you for the sake of you, the king, and you may decide for yourself whether you shall rally to our cause or not."

The king having made up his mind, Korea did not offer any thanks (for this kindness).

The Korean troops repeatedly crossed their frontiers and opposed our troops engaged in Warka,|| and were constantly fighting with our Beileh of Wula Puchantai.

When the Emperor T'ai-tsu died, Korea sent no messages of condolence.

* This refers to the Songpha inscription at Sam-jön do, of which a translation is given further on.

† See Legge's *Shu king* (*Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. III.), p. 65.

‡ 海蓋軍, which is explained to me as the Hai-chou and Kai-chou divisions of the army.

§ The text has 富察, which I have taken as an abbreviation for 富居察訪 in Ham-gyōng do.

|| Warka is N. of the Yalu river and S. of Mukden at the foot of the Chang-pai shan. It is conterminous with Korea. (Note in the *Sheng wu chi*).

The Ming general, Mao Wen-lung, got together several tens of thousands of refugees from Liao-tung in Pi-do, which is also called Tong-gang, and is situated at the mouth of the Yalu river at 80 *li* from Korea and from our eastern border.* From there he made repeated forays on the sea-board towns and cantonnments, causing us great annoyance, forning with Korea as it were a pair of horns (between which we were caught).

Having procured the services of two Korean deserters, Han Yun and Chang Mai, who had escaped to our country, to act as guides, war was declared against Korea in the 1st year T'ien tsung of the Emperor T'ai-tsung (1627), the 7th year T'ien-chi of the Ming, the 3d year of the reign of Ni-Sung of Korea.† In the 1st month, the Beileh Amin and others were ordered to take command of the troops and enter Korea. After fording the Yalu river, and defeating Mao Wen-lung's troops at Chhöl-san,‡ which fled back to Pi-do, the towns of Wi-ju, Jöng-ju and the fortress of Han-san were occupied, and many myriads of soldiers and people killed and over 100,000 measures of grain destroyed.

The same month, the army, having crossed the Chhông-chhön gang,§ took An-ju, which place bore the name of An-si, when it was besieged by the first emperor of the T'ang dynasty. The troops then occupied Ph्योंg-yang,|| from which place the officials and people had fled at their approach. After this they crossed the Ta-tong river and occupied Chung-hwa.¶

In the 2d month Hwang-ju** was captured and consternation spread to the heart of the country. Succor was asked of the Ming, and numerous envoys were sent to try and arrange matters with us. The Ming governor of Liao-tung, Yüan Ch'ung-huan by name, sent a fleet to relieve Pi-do, and 9000 picked troops took up a position on the San-ch'a ho,†† to close the road to our army (i. e. cut off its retreat). The Emperor, fearing the consequences of the stationing by the Ming of this corps of observation, went in person to defend the frontier and animate his troops, and the banks of the Liao were put in a state of defense.

* I do not find this place on any of the maps at my disposal.

† In 1623 the people of Korea deposed Ni-hu and put on ho the throne his nephew, the Prince of Ling-yang (綾陽君) Ni-Sung.—See *Ming shih*, B. 320, p. 27.

‡ A 2d class prefecture town in Pyöng-an do. The towns of Wi-ju, Jöng-ju, are also situated in the same province.

§ The Ching-ch'uan chiang of modern maps. It empties into the sea S.W. of An-ju.

|| A 2d class prefecture in Pyöng-an do, and a little west of the Ta-tong river.

¶ Also in Pyöng-an do, near the border of Hwang-hai do.

** In Hwang-hai do, on the Ta-tong river; it is a 1st class prefecture.

†† The San-ch'a ho flows into Liao ho a little above New-chwang.

At the same time the expeditionary forces to Korea were closing around Söul, so Ni-sung took his wife and son and fled to the island of Kang-hwa, sending repeatedly messengers to meet the army and confess his errors. Now the island of Kang-hwa is south of Kai-ju* and in the sea, so our army, being without any boats, could not cross over to it, but an envoy was sent to the island to communicate the Emperor's orders. In the meanwhile the troops stopped at Ph्योंg-san.†

Ni-sung sent a relative of his called Ni-gak, Prince of Wön-ch'ang, and others, with presents, consisting of 100 horses, 100 tiger-skins and 100 panther-skins, 100 pieces of pongee and hemp cloth, and 15,000 pieces of cotton cloth (as peace-offerings to the Emperor). After this envoys were sent to Kang-hwa island to make a treaty, and on the day *keng wu* of the third month, a white horse and a black ox‡ having been slaughtered, (both parties) took an oath by heaven and earth when the negotiations were completed. The treaty was as concluded between kingdoms of elder and younger brothers. It had first been sought for by Korea; and the Beileh, in view of the danger of their two enemies, the Ming and the Mongols, cutting them off, and of the impossibility therefore of remaining long (in Korea), and being, moreover, well satisfied with the success of their operations, were willing to conclude a treaty. The Beileh Amin had, however, been so much pleased with the site of Söul and the beauty of its palaces, that he was unwilling to have the army evacuate the country. So the Beileh Chi-erh-ha-lang and Yüeh-t'o-shuo-t'o, having secretly discussed the subject, ordered Amin to go to Ph्योंg-san, and while he was away they concluded the treaty. When the matter was finished they told Amin. Amin replied that he had made no treaty, so he ravaged the whole country. Later on, however, Ni-gak made a treaty with him at the town of Ph्योंg-yang. The Emperor (in the meanwhile) sent a courier to Amin with orders to commit no further ravages whatsoever, and to leave a detachment of 3000 men to garrison Wi-ju on his march back.

In the fourth month Ni-gak came to court with the (returning) troops, and in the autumn of the same year Ni-sung requested the recall of the Wi-ju garrison, pledging himself to redeem all the people who had been made captives. The amount of the presents to be sent alternately in spring and autumn to the

* I suppose Kai-söng is meant. It is a 2d class prefecture in Kyöng ki do, N.E. of Kang-hwa island.

† A large town in Hwang-hai do on the main road to Söul. It is a 2d class prefecture.

‡ It may be of interest to note that the black oxen used in Korea for royal sacrifices are exclusively supplied by Quelpart island. They are sent in pairs, and always kept in readiness at all the towns on the road from Quelpart to Söul, being forwarded to the capital as required.

Emperor was agreed upon, as also the question of the fair for the peoples of both countries at Chung-gang* (or Wi-ju).

The same year the Ming commander-in-chief, Yüan Ch'ung-huan, killed Mao Wen-lung at Shuang-tao,† and the troops of the islands were without a chief.

In the 3d year (1629) our army routed the Ming, and their general Yüan Ch'ung-huan was put to death for his former misdeeds.

In the 5th year (1631), the islands (off the Korean coast) having been occupied, thanks to their unprotected condition, ships of war were sent to Korea, and an envoy arrived at Söul. He was received in audience the third day after his arrival, when Ni-sung said to him: "The Ming dynasty is as a father; how can I be expected to help to destroy my father!" From this time on the treaty (of 1627) was gradually more and more disregarded.

In the 7th year (1633), the Emperor wrote to Ni-sung charging him with cutting down the annual gifts, harboring refugees from our country, stealing our ginseng and cattle. He also charged him with designs of ceasing to send envoys, and of closing the (Wi-ju) market to our people.

In the summer (of the same year), the brigadier-general under Mao Wen-lung, Kung Yo-tê by name, and also Keng Chung-ming and Shang K'o-hsi and others, deserted the Ming, and with a fleet and 20,000 men set to sea from Teng-chou, and came and made their submission (to the Manchus).

A mission was sent to Korea to levy tribute-grain with these words: "Your country looks upon the Ming as a father, and many times you have sent them tribute-rice. Now we are your elder brother, can you not give it us once?" But Ni-sung would not agree to it. Wait (he said) until Kung Yo-tê has left Shen-yang (Sheng-ching), and we will send of ourselves officers on ships and forward rice as a subsidy.‡ As to the question of the Hui-ning refugees and the Pu-chan-tai people, it has been the subject of frequent communications. He hereon pushed the building of twelve walled cities in the provinces of Kyong-kwi do, Hwang-hai do, and Phyong-an do.

The Emperor's letter charged Ni-sung with breaking the Wi-ju market treaty, (in that he had) stopped our satins and linens and depreciated the value of our ginseng.§ As to the

* See p. 21.

† There is an island by this name off Shan-tung province, but I do not know if this is the place meant.

‡ My translation of this passage is subject to correction.

§ Formerly the value of an ounce of (our) ginseng had been Tls. 16.0.0, but Korea only gave Tls. 9.0 (for it). When first Wu Han-cha went to Ninguta, he cooked half a catty of ginseng and ate it; on going back he had diarrhoea. So cheap was ginseng in the early days. (Note of the *Sheng wu chi*.)

Warka people, they were of a Nü-chen tribe, and not to be compared with the Pu-chan-tai Mongols, for they are said to be of the same stock as ourselves (i. e., Manchus), as may be seen by referring to the Liao and Chin dynastic histories.

In the spring of the 8th year (1634), the Emperor, being desirous of concluding a treaty with the Ming, ordered Ni-sung to inform them of the fact; but Ni-sung wrote to the general at Pi-do in such terms that no treaty was made.

That winter an envoy of Ni-sung came rejecting the demand for the (Hui-ning) refugees and for that about the (Wi-ju) market. He used most arrogant language, and wished to take precedence over our high ministers. The Emperor was angered at this, refused the gifts, and would have nothing more to do with the King's envoy.

When first Korean envoys came to our Court, they exchanged frequent courtesies (with our high officers). We on our part sent envoys to Korea to condole at the death of the King's father, mother, or consort. The King's letters (to the Emperor) were called *feng shu* (奉書) and his tribute *sui pi* (歲幣). The expression *kuei kuo* (貴國) was reciprocally used, and instead of *pi kuo* (敝國) the expression *pu ku* (不穀) was used, in accordance with usages prevailing between neighboring countries which are on a footing of equality.

At this time the Manchu troops had subdued the Ch'ahar tribes of Lingdan Khan and possessed themselves of the dynastic seal of the Yüan.* In view of this the Beileh Pa-ho-shuo and forty-nine Beileh of the outer barbarians and Mongols petitioned the Emperor to take an additional title.† The Emperor replied, "Korea is a younger brother country, with whom it is also necessary to discuss the question." So the inner and outer Beileh wrote letters and sent messengers, requesting Korea to join with them in requesting the Emperor to add to his titles. Not only did the Koreans disagree to the proposal, but they set a guard of soldiers over the envoy. At this the envoy Ying-o-eh-tai and his suite seized horses and rushed out of the city. Ni-sung sent a messenger bearing a letter after him, and also wrote to the high officer at the frontier to keep a strict watch.

This was a breach of the peace terms of the *ting mao* year (1627); now therefore it was necessary to interrupt all communications; so the envoy continued his flight, and reported the occurrence to the Emperor.

* See Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, I., p. 379. The Ming had never held this seal. It was held by the Ch'ahar prince lineally representing the Mongol dynasty. See also *China Review*, vol. xv., p. 323.

† This is a literal rendering of the text; it might be better translated, however, by "petitioned the Emperor to take the title of Emperor of China."

In the 10th year T'ien-tsung, the 8th year of Ming Ch'ung-cheng, the 4th month of the 1st year Tsung-tê (1636), the Korean envoy Ni Kek and others came to Court to congratulate the Emperor; but they did not make obeisance. The Emperor sent the King a letter ordering him to send hostages. To this no reply was made.

At this time the Emperor with the tributary Mongols had utterly routed the Ming army, and the country was in security. So it was that in the 11th month, after having sacrificed to heaven and earth and made sacrifice to the god of war at T'ai miao and T'ang-tzu, the Emperor started on an expedition to punish Korea for having broken the treaty.

In the 12th month (1637), the Mongols having concentrated their forces, the Emperor ordered the Cheng Chin-wang Chiehr-ha-lang to see to the defense of the country. The Wu-ying Chün-wang A-chi-ko and the To-lo jao-yu Beileh Apat'ai he ordered to hold the Liao river and the coast ports, so as to cover the country from an attack by the Ming fleet. He ordered the Jui Chin-wang To-eh-r-kun and the Beileh Hao-ko to take the left wing of the Manchu-Mongol forces, and from K'uan-tien to enter (Korea) by the Ch'ang-shan pass. He commanded the Yü Chin-wang To-to and others to take 1500 men of the vanguard and capture Söul by a *coup de main*, the Beileh Yüeh-t'o and others with 3000 men supporting him.

The Emperor with the Li Chin-wang* Tai-shan and others entered Korea with the main army amounting to 100,000 men. They having crossed the Chin-gang and camped at Kwak-san,† Jöng-ju and An-ju surrendered. The army then marched to the Im-jin gang. This river is a hundred and odd *li* N. of the capital of the kingdom, and Söul is between it and Han-gang which is S. of the capital.‡ At this time of the year the ice was not solid over the whole river; but just as the army carts arrived on its banks, the ice suddenly closed, and the whole army was able to cross over on it.

Three hundred cavalymen under Ma-fu-t'a, belonging to Yü Chin-wang's van-guard, stole up to Söul and routed several thousand picked troops. Ni-sung in dismay sent messengers to welcome (our troops) and to wait on them outside the city, treating the soldiers with great courtesy. In the meanwhile he sent his wife and son to Kang hwa island, while he with his best troops crossed the river and shut himself up in Nam Han-san,

* The Prince of Li gained for himself by his bravery in this campaign the popular title of Prince of Korea (*Kao-li Wang yeh*), which the head of the family still bears.

† A third-class prefecture on the high road from Wi-ju to Pyöng-yang and Söul.

‡ The Im-jin gang has a general direction from N. E. to S. W. and flows into the Han gang a little S. E. of the town of Ni-tök.

the strongest place in his kingdom.* Our troops entered the capital, and Yü Ch'in-wang and the Beileh Yüeh-to who had captured Phyöng-yang arrived there also. The whole force then crossed the river and invested Nam Han-san. They defeated three bodies of troops sent to relieve the place and also the forces in the fortress. At this time the 300 and odd families from Warka who had formerly fled to Korea all came and asked to return to their native land.

The Emperor arrived, and, having divided the police service of Söul among the troops, crossed the river with the army and defeated the relieving forces from Chöl-la do and Chhung-chhông do. Then he sent a letter (to the King) censuring the conduct of his high ministers of state.

In the 1st month of the following year (February, 1637), the army crossed to the north bank of the river, where it camped 20 *li* to the east of Söul. Jui Ch'in-wang, entering (Korea) by the Ch'ang-shan pass, had taken Ch'ang-ju,† and having defeated 15,000 men composing the relieving forces of An-ju, Hwang-ju, Yöng-ju and neighboring places, he made his junction (with the main forces). When the Beileh To-to was sending his artillery (towards Söul), on it reaching the Im-jin gang the ice which was thawing froze tight again (so that it was taken across on it).

Prior to this the King of Korea, Ni-sung, had sent a message to the Ming Emperor informing him of the grave events occurring, and had also sent warning to all the provinces of his kingdom. The prudent King was anxious to keep on the defensive until the auxiliary forces arrived, but the Empire of the Ming was reduced to extremities, the land was everywhere covered with plundering bands and so it was not in a position to help its neighbor. The (Ming) general of Teng-Lai,‡ Ch'en Hung-fan, set to sea with a fleet (to help Korea), but contrary winds prevented his crossing the sea.

The troops from the eastern and southern provinces of Korea had all been successively routed and dispersed. The western and northern forces were hidden among the mountains, and dared not advance. In Söul provisions were nearly exhausted, and our army had gone over all the provinces like roaring thunder or the fiery blast.

* The Han gang is also called the Ung-jin gang, and is a most important defense of Söul. All government money and tribute-rice is brought by it. (Note of *Sheng-wu-chi*.) This fortress is generally called the Kwang-ju fortress and is about 11 miles from Söul. Mr. Foulk gives its height above sea level as 1350 feet. He says that on the occasion spoken of in these pages it was defended against the Chinese army by its villagers and 120 soldiers. See *U. S. Foreign Relations, 1885*, p. 326.

† A strongly fortified place on the Yalu river above Wi-ju.

‡ The Teng-Lai Ch'ing circuit in Shantung.

Ni-sung having again written to the Emperor begging for peace, he replied throwing the responsibility of the war on him, and ordered him to come out of the fortress into his presence, and to deliver up those who had been his counsellors in breaking the treaty. Ni-sung then wrote to the Emperor saying: "Your servant (臣) begs that he may not have to come out of the fortress."

In the meanwhile the queen and the crown prince, together with the families of the high ministers of state, were on Kang-hwa island. Jui Ch'in-wang put to sea in some barges, and having sunk with his cannon thirty large boats of the Koreans, crossed over to Kang-hwa, where he defeated the garrison of over 1000 men and entered the island fortress. He captured the queen, the crown prince, and their household, seventy-six persons in all, and 166 persons belonging to the families of the high ministers of state. These were, however, all treated like guests and assigned separate apartments. Then the Emperor issued a proclamation saying: "Ni-sung's island of Kang-hwa has been taken, but his family has been subjected to no hardship; let him at once, as previously directed, leave the citadel and come into our presence."

Ni-sung sent to the Emperor's headquarters those who had advised him to break the treaty: Eun-ki, a *kyo-ri** of the Hong-mun Kuan, Wo Tal-ché, the Compiler of the Academy, and Hong I-han, chief councillor of state.

The Emperor then ordered the King to give him the patent of investiture and the seal which he had received from the Ming, to offer his allegiance, to give him two of his sons as hostages, to adopt the (Manchu) new year,† and to send each year tribute (貢) with a congratulatory address (表). In case of war he would have to raise an auxiliary force and furnish supplies to the army. He was not to erect fortresses (or walled cities) at his pleasure, or give refuge to fugitives. On these conditions the boundaries of the fief (封) which his ancestors had held for the last three hundred years would be assured to him and suffer no changes.

Ni-sung with bowed head received the Imperial commands.

In the second month (the King) came out of the fortress

* Dr. H. N. Allen, Foreign Secretary of the Korean Legation, Washington, writes to me: "*Kyo-rey* or Secretary or the Hong-mun office, which is a library of historical matters, the officials of which are very near to the King and keep him posted in matters of history by answering his questions and looking up disputed points. The Secretary alluded to also hears the King read a passage of history every three days and corrects him if he makes mistakes."

† That is to say, adopt the Chinese calendar, which is, according to Chinese customs, a proof of recognition of Chinese suzerainty. The almanac is given each year in the 10th month (latter part of November) to a special Korean envoy who comes to Peking to receive it.

with several tens of horsemen and built on the (south) east bank of the Han gang at Sam-jon do* an altar, and erected a yellow tent. Then the Emperor with an escort, having crossed the river, ascended to the altar to the sound of music while his officers in armor lined the way. Ni-sung escorted by his ministers left Nam Han san, and when five *li* (from the altar) proceeded the rest of the way on foot. Our Emperor sent a messenger to welcome him when he was a *li* off, and to inform him of the ceremonies to be performed. The Emperor having descended to receive Ni-sung, both of them together with the King's sons and his ministers worshiped heaven.

This ceremony being ended, the Emperor took up his former position, and Ni-sung and his suite fell to the ground and acknowledged their transgressions, which the Emperor pardoned. Then once more Ni-sung and his sons and ministers respectfully bowed their heads nine times in thanks. The Emperor then told the King to take a seat at the foot of the altar on the left hand side facing the west, taking precedence of all the princes (王). The ceremonies being ended, the Prince (君), his ministers, and their families returned to Söul.

In the second month all the troops in the provinces were ordered to concentrate (at Söul) and to march westward. Ni-sung and his sons and ministers escorted (the Emperor) ten *li* outside the city, and kneeling down bade him good-bye.

The Emperor issued a decree stating that, in view of the sufferings of Korea through the recent military operations, he remitted the tribute for the years *ting chou* (1637) and *wu yin* (1638), and that the first tribute would be that of the autumn of the year *chi mao* (1639). In case Korea had not the power at any time to meet its obligations, the Emperor would devise means of arranging matters.

The Korean ministers of state and the people erected a monument at the foot of the altar at San-jön do to commemorate the Emperor's goodness.†

In the 4th month, Ni-sung's hostage-sons Wang and Ho arrived (at Mukden).

In the 5th month, the Ming troops on Pi-do were attacked, General Kung Yo-tê and others who had deserted the Ming acting as guides, and Korean war vessels being made use of. Several myriad persons were captured on the island; after which (our troops) returned, nor did the Ming thereafter occupy the island.

In the 3rd year of Ch'ung-tê (1638), the Emperor, being

* Sam-jon do is a post station S. of Söul and between that town and the prefectural city of Kuang-ju. See p. 26 Mr. Foulk's remarks on this place.

† See p. 27 *et seq.* the text and translation of this inscription.

desirous of crushing the Ming, ordered the Korean troops to coöperate with his, but they were so dilatory that he had to address reproaches to the King. The Emperor then ordered him to send a fleet to reduce those Kurka of the eastern border who, having rebelled, had fled to Ung do; this he did, capturing the rebel leader, who was brought to the Emperor.

In the 6th year (1641), our army having attacked the Ming troops at Chin-chou,* a Korean fleet with 5000 men was ordered to convey 10,000 piculs of tribute rice. After a while Ni-sung reported that the 32 war vessels and grain junks with all their crews and rice had been lost at sea. The Emperor, seeing that tribute rice fleets had ere that been exposed to severe weather but that the whole fleet had never thus been lost, reprimanded the King, who hastened to send a second time the 10,000 piculs of rice. This fleet was composed of 115 ships, which started out from the mouths of the Ta-ling and Siao-ling rivers. When off San-shan-tao, over 50 ships were wrecked, and others were captured by the Ming fleet. 52 ships reached Kai-chou in safety, but they could advance no further, so they requested to complete the transportation by land, but the Emperor refused to allow them to do so. Three of the Korean vessels (he said) had sailed into Ming waters and delivered letters. Furthermore, when falling in with Ming war vessels they had not acted with them as with enemies, and now they had stopped on the way: "We do not want this grain, you can throw it on the road or take it back to your country just as you please."

The Korean Minister Ni Kyöng-ep, alarmed at this, requested to be permitted to brave the dangers of transporting the grain, and the Emperor allowed him to take the overland route and he would retain in his service a thousand Koreans as matchlock men and 500 as camp followers, all the others to return home. But neither the tribute rice nor the soldiers arriving, the Emperor sent an envoy to Korea to complain of the conduct of the Ministers of State. The envoy proved that the President Kim Syeng-heuk-ni and the Minister of the Council Shin Teuk-yöng had caused the delay, and reported the facts to the Throne.

In the 7th year took place the great defeat of Chin-chou, after which the Ming sent envoys to make peace. This the Emperor was willing to do, but all his generals were anxious to carry on the war. The Emperor wrote to Ni-sung asking his advice. Ni-sung replied, "Not to kill but to give peace to the people is to act in conformity with the will of heaven."

* Chin chou-Fu on the Hsiao-ling ho in the Feng-Chin-Shan-hai circuit of Sheng-ching.

Later on it was discovered that two ships of the Ming had come to Korea. The Emperor had strict inquiries made, after which the Minister of the Council Soi Myeng-ki, General Im Kyōng-ep and others were arrested for having secretly kept up communication with the Ming, and were punished after trial.

In the 9th month of the 8th year (November 1643), the Emperor Shih-tsu-chang ascended the Throne, and one-third of the Korean tribute for the year was remitted in conformity with the Emperor T'ai-tsung's dying commands.

In the first year of Shun-chih (1644),* on the re-establishment of peace, the Korean hostages were sent home and one-half of the year's tribute was remitted. Furthermore a general pardon was granted (by the King) to all Korean criminals condemned to death.

During the three reigns of K'ang-hsi, Yung-cheng, and Ch'ien-lung the tribute was frequently remitted, only one-tenth being kept; and notwithstanding the fact that Korea belonged to the outer barbarian nations, it was assimilated to the Chinese.

From the time of K'ang-hsi, whenever there has been a famine in Korea, grain has been sent there by junks to relieve it; and whenever there has been a rebellion in the land, troops and myriads of taels as subsidy have been given to assist in its repression.

III.

The extract from the *Sheng-wu-chi* given in the preceding chapter offers us a general account of the relations between Korea and the Ta ch'ing dynasty of China. We will now examine, with the help of the Dynastic Institutes of the Ta ch'ing (*Ta ch'ing hui-tien*), the nature of the relations which have obtained between the two countries since the invasion of 1637.

The treaty signed in 1637 provided that Korea should send yearly tribute-bearing missions to the Manchu Court. The tribute originally demanded comprised 100 ounces of gold, 1000 ounces of silver, 200 pieces of grass cloth, 200 pieces of a mixed silk and cotton stuff, 4400 pieces of cotton stuffs of various colors, 2 mats with dragon patterns, 20 mats with flower patterns, 100 deer skins, 400 otter skins, 142 leopard skins, 300 blue rat skins,† 10 girdle knives, 5000 rolls of large and small paper, and 100 piculs of rice.

The amount of tribute was gradually decreased, and in 1723 the Emperor issued a decree stating that "Chao-hsien has from

* From this date commences the Manchu rule over the Chinese Empire.

† The text has 青黍; the latter character is probably an error for 鼠. This error occurs in several passages of the *Hui tien*.

early days been obedient to our dynasty, and has been sedulously vigilant as a neighboring country; and on many occasions when brought to Court in obedience to the Imperial will, articles of tribute have, as a special act of grace, been remitted. Let now the Board of Rites inquire what among the tribute that is still due can henceforth be remitted.

"The Board of Rites reported that during the Ming period the Korean tribute comprised gold and silver utensils, ginseng, horses, and 10 different varieties of grass cloth, mixed cotton and silk fabrics, etc. In 1637, one-half of the tribute due the Emperor was remitted. In 1640, 9000 bags of tribute rice were remitted. In the Shun chih-reign (1644-1662), all the gold and silver utensils, the ginseng, and the horses were permanently remitted.

"In 1693, Korea was dispensed from sending the 100 ounces of gold and 100 of silver, the blue and red dye, and 600 pieces of cotton stuff.

"In 1712, the whole 1000 ounces of silver and the 142 leopard skins were remitted, the tribute being thus reduced to less than half what it was in the Ming period.

"The following articles can now be done away with: 300 blue rat skins, 100 otter skins, 800 pieces of cotton piece goods, and 2000 rolls of white cotton-made paper; the balance of the tribute remaining as heretofore." (*Hui tien*, Ch. 393.)

Besides sending the annual tribute mission, the King of Korea sent representatives to the Chinese Court to congratulate the Emperor on New Year's Day and also on special occasions of rejoicing—as in 1763, when the Empress celebrated her 80th birth-day, or in 1785, on the Emperor Ch'ien-lung's jubilee. It was also customary, when the Emperor went to Manchuria to visit his ancestral tombs, for the King of Korea to send him congratulatory messages and presents. Thus in 1682, when the Emperor K'ang-hsi visited his ancestral tombs, the King of Korea sent an envoy and the following presents: leopard, deer, otter, and blue rat skins, Japanese swords, haliotis shells, various kinds of fish, edible sea-weed, red shells, chili pepper, white honey, pine nuts, apricot seeds, yellow chestnuts (?), and dried persimmons. Down to 1715 it was also customary for the King of Korea to send missions to return thanks to the Emperor for any favor which he had bestowed on him; but from that date the Emperor requested them to be discontinued.

The fact was that the Koreans sought by every means to increase the number of these missions to China, for they traveled at the expense of the Chinese government, and, being allowed to bring goods for sale duty free, they constituted a source of great profit to the King and his officers.

We have seen that Ni Söng-Ke, the founder of the Chao-hsien dynasty, continuing the traditions of the Kao-li dynasty, had asked the Emperor of China to recognize his title to the throne. The policy of this proceeding cannot be doubted, for by it alone could he hope to establish firmly his rule, and enter into relations with his powerful neighbor. Moreover, China has always been for Korea like the head of the family; the Ming dynasty was "a father to Korea" and the Manchu dynasty an "elder brother." Not only do we find expression given to this feeling in official papers, but it is one which I have found existing everywhere among the Korean people of to-day. The Korean looks at China's ruler not as the suzerain of his king, but as the head of the great family to which he belongs; and to my mind the particular relations existing between the reigning families of the two countries are based on the sacred relations of father to son and of elder brother to younger brother. The so-called investiture of the King of Korea by the Emperor of China is nothing else than the approval of the younger brother's action by the head of the family. If this explanation does not apply to all the *shu kuo*, it appears justified in the special case of Korea. Even the Emperor himself, as late as 1882, speaks of Korea as his "near kindred." (See *Peking Gazette*, Sept. 23, 1882.) As to the custom of submitting to the Emperor the choice made by the king of an heir to the throne, or of a consort, or informing him of the death of his mother, of his wife, etc., we can look at them as only strictly ceremonial relations, bearing with them no idea of subordination. As well as I can learn, there has been no case in which the Emperor of China has disapproved of the choice the king of Korea has made of his successor or his queen. In 1699, the king had his son by a concubine recognized as his heir, the queen having no children. In 1722 and in 1724, he asked for the recognition of his younger brother as his heir. In 1763, the grandson of the then reigning king is recognized as heir to the throne, the Peking Board of Rites quoting the *Li Ki* (*T'ao kung*, 1.) to show that a grandson is the natural heir to the throne, if the son dies during his father's lifetime.

In 1691, the King of Korea asked the Emperor's approval of his again taking as his consort a person whom he had previously put away in favor of a concubine, and of reducing the latter to her former rank.* All these requests, and every other one recorded, were granted.†

* A correspondent in the *North China Daily News* writing from Mukden under date April 5, 1887, says that this request was made in 1694. The *Hui tien* says, in the 30th year of K'ang-hsi (1691).

† Twice at least during the Ming dynasty the people of Korea chose their sovereign without consulting China, and the latter power only

Besides the presents which the Emperors sent the Kings of Korea by their envoys on their return home, special envoys have always been sent to carry the Emperor's letters to the king, approving of his acts or condoling with him for deaths in his family. A narrative of the ceremonies observed on the arrival at Söul of such missions will be found in the translation given further on of an extract from the diary of Po Chün, who was sent on a special mission to Korea in 1843.

China, moreover, in all times of internal warfare or discord in Korea, has observed a strict neutrality and has always closed her frontiers on all fugitives from Korea, as for example in 1729, when the Emperor Yung-cheng had at the request of the King of Korea given him 10,000 taels to assist in suppressing a revolt in his kingdom. A decree was issued at the same time by the Emperor ordering the officers at the frontier passes and elsewhere to seize any fugitives who might present themselves and forward them to the capital, "for it is the policy of our dynasty to endeavor to have such men punished." In case any Chinese subjects should secrete such rebel fugitives, they were to be severely punished. See *Hui tien*, Ch. 399.

In 1777, the Emperor Ch'ien-lung issued the following decree: "The King of Chao-hsien has written to us that in the matter of the conspiracy of Hong In-han and others the chief culprits had been put to death. He fears; however, that there are many persons implicated in the plot, and that possibly some have escaped and are in concealment, and he requests that the officers at the barriers may be instructed to look out for such criminals and apprehend any they may find. The rulers of Chao-hsien have long been devoted to us, and have ever shown due reverence; now as the king is apprehensive lest any of the rebels escape, we have informed him that we would adopt measures for preventing any of them entering China surreptitiously. Let this be communicated to the Tartar general at Mukden, and to the Governor of Shan-tung, so that officers along the Korean frontier and on the coast roads may be instructed by them to use great diligence in this matter. . . . Any Korean arrested will be handed over to the authorities of his country to be dealt with. . . ." (*Hui tien*, Ch. 399.)

Among the different questions which have arisen between the governments of Peking and Söul, the following may be mentioned:

In 1731, the Tartar general at Mukden asked the Emperor to

entered a mild protest. In 1591, the King of Korea, Kung, dying, the Prince of Kuang-hai Hu made himself regent. The Emperor Wan-li ordered the ministers of State and the people of Korea to decide who should be their ruler, and Hu, having been chosen, received investiture. In 1623, the people of Korea deposed this king and put on the throne his nephew, Ni-sung. See *Ming shih*, B. 320, pp. 25 and 27.

authorize the erection of a military station at Mang-neu-shao, at the confluence of the Ts'ao ho with the Ai ho.* The Emperor approved of the suggestion, but stated that, the place mentioned being on the Korean frontier, the Board of Rites must address the King and ask his approval and consent.

The King of Korea replied, begging that the old order of things might be adhered to, and the Emperor issued a decree accordingly.

In 1746, this question was brought up again as was also that of opening up to settlers the "no man's land" between the barrier of stakes and the Korean frontier. The King of Korea wrote to the Emperor opposing both measures. The Emperor replied as follows: "We have the greatest consideration for Korea, and have heretofore bestowed many favors upon it. Now as to this question of erecting a watch station at Mang-neu-shao, it has been carefully looked into. It is situated on the Korean frontier, and the proposed measure cannot cause trouble or disturb the peace. Moreover, it is to the equal advantage of both countries. Notwithstanding this, the King tells us that it is inexpedient, and earnestly requests that the project be abandoned. As we cannot possibly know the exact character of this section of country, let it therefore be examined into and a report made to us. If the locality is really within the frontier of China, then the establishment of a military guard-house to prevent brigandage, establish order, and guard the frontier is a necessary measure.

"As to the King of Korea's request that the post be not established because the locality in question is debatable land, it is impossible not to have doubtful places, as his frontier is intricately intermixed with ours, so we cannot countermand our orders as the King requests.

"As to the question of opening to agriculture land outside the barrier of stakes, a subject which has in former times been under deliberation, the King of Korea asks that there be left as heretofore a hundred and odd *li* of uninhabited land outside the barrier of stakes of Feng-huang-ch'eng, as an obstacle to intercourse between the two countries and as a means of preventing a congregating of people on the frontier which would create all kinds of trouble. This request is approved of; so the prohibition concerning settling on the land outside the barrier of Feng-huang-ch'eng will remain in vigor as heretofore."† (*Hui tien*, Ch. 399.)

* The Ts'ao ho flows into the Ai ho a short distance E. of the Feng-huang barrier of stakes. The Ai ho flows into the Yalu a little above Wi-ju.

† In 1875, this neutral strip between China and Korea was incorporated into the Chinese domain, on the proposition of Li Hung-chang. See Griffiths, *Corea*, p. 182.

In all cases where Koreans passed onto Chinese territory and there committed crimes for which they were seized by the Chinese authorities, or in cases where the crimes were committed on Korean territory by Chinese subjects, the culprits were handed over to the authorities of their respective countries to be dealt with. See for example decree of 1704 (*Hui tien*, Ch. 399), also *Peking Gazette*, May 14, 1877, Oct. 8, 1876, etc.

The commercial relations existing between the two countries now demand our consideration.

The regular trade between Korea and China was transacted (1) twice a year at Wi-ju on the Yalu river, and (2) by the Korean missions to Peking.

The fair at Wi-ju was held twice a year in the 2d and the 8th months, and the trading was done on the part of the Chinese by the military stationed in the Feng-huang and Feng-t'ien fu (Mukden) districts.

In 1736, Ch'ien-lung issued a decree stating that "heretofore the officers and troops of the banner corps stationed at the frontier posts have gone each year in the 2d month with merchandise to Chung-chiang, to trade there with the Koreans. We consider that these bannermen's sole duty is to watch and patrol, and that they have no time for trading, and moreover they know nothing about mercantile operations. It is also to be feared that this trading prevents a proper surveillance of people arriving on the frontier. This system has, therefore, many inconveniences. Hereafter (the trade will be open to all and) the custom officer at Chung-chiang will carefully watch all Chinese who are trading with Koreans, so that trade may be carried on without partiality, extortion, or brawls." (*Hui tien*, B. 398.)

The following year, however, the King of Korea wrote to the Emperor requesting that the old order of things be put again in force, and his request was acceded to.

A small trade was carried on between Kirin and Ninguta and Korea, but the most valuable articles from those localities, such as sable, sea otter, river otter, lynx skins, etc., were not allowed to be exported. (See *Hui tien*, B. 399, 44th Ch'ien-lung.)*

The number of persons who might accompany the Korean missions to Peking for purposes of trade, and the quantity of

* I may here remark that questions have frequently arisen between the Chinese and Korean authorities caused by hunters of the latter nationality crossing over into Chinese territory to hunt fur-bearing animals. See for example the case which occurred in 1763. *Hui tien*, B. 399, 28th Ch'ien-lung. So likewise the Chinese government has had to complain of Koreans hunting for mountain ginseng on Chinese territory.

goods they might bring with them, do not appear to have been determined by regulation. Not so, however, the road which they might follow, which was that by Feng-huang-ch'eng and Shan-hai kuan.

In 1748 the Board of Rites issued the following notification: "When Koreans enter Shan-hai kuan with merchandise of Korean origin, the superintendent of customs must examine whether they agree in quantity and description with those reported to him by the official at Feng huang ch'eng.

"Koreans going out by Shan-hai kuan with merchandise will pay no duties if the goods they have agree with the list forwarded by the Board of Rites. Goods not mentioned in the list and not of Korean origin will pay regular duties. As to the trick of travelers smuggling goods concealed on their persons, they must be examined to see that they carry no prohibited goods, and in case they do, the superintendent must report to the Board of Rites for the punishment of the offender."

On arriving in Peking, the number of Korean traders was reported to the throne and permission given them to trade, but there were many articles which they were not allowed to purchase, such as arms, munitions of war, the dynastic histories of China,* horn for making bows, etc. These restrictions were not against Koreans alone, but applied to all foreigners trading in China. Special restrictions against Korean trade seem to have been directed against the exportation of silver and metals.† Thus, in 1793, the King of Korea asked that the goods which he had sent to Peking might be exchanged for money to be taken back for use in his kingdom. The request was refused.

In 1807, an imperial decree threatened the officials on the Korean frontier with degradation if they allowed cash or copper or iron to be exported to Korea.‡

The only restriction concerning the export trade from Korea relates to ginseng, which is a royal monopoly. In 1759 the King of Korea wrote stating: "In the matter of the trade in ginseng, which is a natural product of our kingdom, though the crop is accidentally short this year, it is not usually rare (and therefore constitutes an important article of trade). The King requests that the regulations of 1653 governing the matter, and

* In 1691, one of the members of the Korean mission bought a full set of the dynastic histories. The culprit was degraded by the King of Korea and sent to military servitude on the frontier, and the chief of the mission received the imperial censure. See *Hui tien*, B. 399, 30th K'ang-hsi.

† I note, however, in the *Hui tien*, B. 399, that in 1729 the Siamese envoys had to obtain special permission to purchase ten loads of copper wire.

‡ See also *Hui tien*, B. 399, 14th Chia-Ch'ing, the case of Kung Feng-lai *et al.*

which prohibit buying it as an (ordinary) medicinal substance, be put in force again. He does not request that it be forbidden to buy ginseng, but that the trade be no longer carried on according to the existing regulations." (*Hui tien*, B. 398.)

No direct trade by sea has ever been allowed between China and Korea prior to the treaties with western nations.

As early as 1637, the Manchus issued orders to the effect that all Chinese merchants coming to Korea by sea must be sent back to their country.

In 1717, the Board of Rites issued the following notification: "Hereafter, when Chinese reach Korea through stress of weather, if they have passports and no business to transact, they shall be sent home according to established rules. If they have no passports and have surreptitiously crossed the river frontier for purposes of business, the King of Korea will have them seized, judged, and punished according to the laws of the kingdom: the Korean authorities reporting to the Board of Rites what they have done in the case." (*Hui tien*, B. 399.)

The right to fish on the Korean coasts was not conceded to China by Korea, most probably so as to prevent smuggling. In 1712, the Emperor K'ang-hsi issued a decree stating: "In former times fishing boats were strictly forbidden to frequent the Korean coast, but at present boats go on the coasts of Korea and fish. This is an act of piracy. Henceforth the Koreans may pursue and capture such persons. If captured alive, they must at once be sent back to China."

The rules issued to prevent smuggling over the land frontier were no less stringent on the part of China. In 1715 the Emperor states to the Board of Rites: "... As regards persons surreptitiously crossing the Yalu river, a communication will be addressed to the Tartar General at Mukden, the Prefect of Feng-t'ien fu, and the different governors general that they instruct the naval authorities along the coast to capture and punish all persons caught in the attempt. Moreover, the King of Korea has been written to (咨文) with a request that he give stringent orders to his troops stationed along the seaboard to be continually on the lookout for persons crossing the frontier without permission, to apprehend them and send them back to China."

We know by the accounts given us by the French missionaries when they attempted to enter Korea how well these orders were executed down to the signing of the treaties.

It should have been stated that all questions which had to be submitted by Korea to the Chinese government were addressed by it to the Peking Board of Rites, the same board with which all foreign nations dealt until the Tsungli Yamen was created in 1861. From 1764 until a few years ago, all questions of

minor importance, such as those concerning the return of shipwrecked seamen, of violation of the frontier, etc., were addressed to the officer at Feng-huang ch'eng, who forwarded them to the Board of Rites at Mukden, to be by it passed on to the Peking Board of Rites; by this means the Koreans had not to send special envoys for unimportant matters.

IV.

(Translation.)*

On the 21st of the 2d month, (Po Chün) having passed through a narrow defile came to a stone archway called the Ying-en men or the Mu-hua kuan. After he had been resting here awhile under an awning, the King (of Korea) came to welcome the Imperial letter, after which he preceded the embassy to the city.† Then mounting their horses, preceded by the Imperial letter borne under a canopy and accompanied by a great armed retinue, the embassy entered Söul by the Ch'ung-li men, the main southern gate.‡ Advancing along a wide market street some three or four *li*, they entered the Tun-hua men (which is believed to lead into the forbidden city). To prevent staring into the park, screens of cotton had been put up all along the way. Going around to the east by the Chin-shan men, they passed by the Jen-chang men and entered the Su-chang men. Following a circuitous route they then came to the Ming-cheng men, where they alighted from their horses. The masters of ceremonies introduced the envoys into the King's presence, the chief envoy bearing in both hands the Imperial letter, which he placed on the eastern table in the Ming-chen tien. Then, while they stood to one side, the King went through the usual ceremonies standing at the foot of the steps.

When this was done, the masters of ceremonies requested the envoys to leave the hall and to enter a small pavilion, where they removed their long black sheepskin gowns. After

* Extract from Po Chün's (柏俊) Diary of his mission to Korea in 1843 (奉使朝鮮驛程日記).

† The envoy and the King did not meet. (Note of Chinese author). The envoys of the Emperor of China to Korea are called in the latter country Ch'ik-sa or Imperial envoys.

‡ See map of Söul annexed. The following figures, taken from the Dynastic Institutes of Korea (*Tai jon hoi t'ong*) B. 6, may not be devoid of interest: "The walls of Söul are 14,935 *pu* in circumference, or 89,610 feet (*chih*), the foot of the Chou dynasty being used." I do not know whether the Korean pace (*pu*) corresponds with that now in use in China, but assuming the two measures to be of the same length, viz. 5.26 English feet, we find that the length of the walls of Söul is about 41½ *li*, or nearly 13½ English miles.

a good while, when the King had put on mourning clothes,* they were requested to come to a hall, and going around to the east they came to the Hall of the Manes. The two envoys each in turn made an offering and poured out a libation. When this was finished, they took their place facing the north, and the King stood facing south on the top of the northern steps. Then the King and all his family in mourning fell on their faces while they listened to the contents of the Imperial letter. When this was over, the masters of ceremonies told all present to cry (the host and guests alike). When this was finished, (the King) raised the Imperial letter (to his head) and incense having been burnt, the ceremonies were at an end.

Walking to the right and left, the envoys then went to the back of the hall, where they and the King saluted each other and separated. They then went to the pavilion where they had changed their clothes, and took off their riding jackets. After waiting awhile, they were invited into the Meng-cheng tien to perform the tea ceremony. While the two envoys stood facing the west, the King, who wore his ordinary clothes and was standing facing south, intimated his desire to salute them in turn. Thrice they refused, and finally they exchanged salutations. The King then asked about the Emperor's and Empress's health, to which suitable replies were made. After this they all sat down, and the King asked if our princes and *beileh* were in good health. He then asked the envoys if they had had a prosperous journey, and whether it had been warm or cold. Tea and fruit were then brought, and the King, taking a pair of silver chopsticks in his hand, invited them to eat. Having partaken of one or two things, the King ordered the attendants to go and take tea, and with this the ceremony ended.

The envoys then prepared to leave, and having exchanged salutations with the King, they walked out by the east and west.† When they had got outside the door of the Ming-cheng tien, they exchanged salutations; then, going down the steps, the envoys got on their horses, when the King saluted them from the doorway and went away.

The envoys then went to the Nam-pyöl Kung, where they abode.

The following day the King returned the envoys' visit, and Po describes it as follows: "The King came to pay a visit. The great hall of the Nam-pyöl Kung was fixed up with folding screens. The envoys received the King at the foot of

* The mission was sent to Korea to offer the Emperor's condolences at the death of the King's father.

† That is to say, the chief envoy and the King walked side by side, the King walking on the east side, the envoy on the west.

the eastern steps, and having exchanged salutations they walked forward together (i. e. side by side). When they reached the hall, they bowed to each other. The King having inquired of them if they had reached home safely the day before, they sat down, and had tea and an entertainment similar to that which they had had the day before. The King, in reply to an inquiry, said that he was eighteen years old.

"The following day, which had been fixed for the departure of the embassy, happened to be an unlucky one,* on which it was impossible to leave, so the King insisted with much earnestness that they should defer their departure, to which the envoys finally consented. They then rose, and having bowed to each other, they went to the foot of the eastern steps. The King would not consent to their seeing him take his leave, so after talking a little, the two envoys stood in the open road until he had left; after which the King sent a person with his card to thank them."

V.

THE SONG P'A INSCRIPTION.†


The inscription of which I offer a translation in this chapter was kindly communicated to me by Lieut. Geo. C. Foulk, U. S. N., formerly Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of the United States in Korea. Mr. Foulk had after much difficulty obtained a rubbing of it in the three languages in which it was written, Chinese, Manchu, and Mongol.

Speaking of the locality in which this valuable record of the past history of Korea stands, Mr. Foulk says:


"Descending into the valley west of the city (of Kwang ju), we moved northwards along its east border to Song pha, a village of historic interest on the south bank of the Seoul River, 7 miles from Kwang ju and 11 from Seoul. It was just behind this village that the Chinese army which besieged Kwang ju had its camp, the remains of which are yet visible in broken down walls and heaps of earth in the fields. On the edge of the village is a tall building of graceful shape, and indicated to be official by its decorations in red, containing a great marble tablet fully 12 feet high and a foot thick, mounted upon the back of a gigantic granite turtle. The front of the stone is closely filled entirely with an inscription deeply cut in what I took to be Manchu Tartar script characters.

* 月忌. Each month has three such days, the 5th, 14th and 23d.


† I have adopted the name in use among Koreans to designate this celebrated inscription. *Song p'a* is the Korean pronunciation of the Chinese characters *sung pei*, meaning 'commemorative tablet.' It would be, however, more accurate to call it the Sam-jôn do inscription, from the name of the place where it stands.



PLAN OF SEOUL.



部五



MAP OF ENVIRONS OF SEOUL.

北京

Hand-drawn map of Beijing and surrounding regions. The map shows the Great Wall of China, major rivers (Yellow River, Hai River), and various cities and towns. Key locations labeled include Beijing (北京), Tianjin (天津), Shijiazhuang (石家庄), Tangshan (唐山), and various smaller towns and villages. The map also shows the Bohai Sea (渤海) to the east.

On the back of the stone is another inscription, only partly covering it, in Chinese square characters. Outside of this building, inclosed by a rough railing, is a second great granite turtle, but without a tablet mounted on it. About the place, irregularly scattered on the ground, were many dressed stones, and a number of the stone posts, columns, sheep, and drums seen about Korean graves.

"An officer stationed at Songpha, a Pyelchang, accompanied me in my inspection of these relics. He stated that after the Chinese had began the invasion of Corea, in 1637, two large marble tablets covered with inscriptions were brought to Corea from China by sea; that the erection of these was violently resisted by Koreans, and one was destroyed; the other was brought to Songpha, and there set up as I saw it, and has been since under the protection of the Korean government. Neither the Pyelchang nor other persons present could (or would) explain the inscriptions, and I was told without special permission from the governor of Kwang ju copies of them could not be made."*

The Chinese text of this inscription is not without many difficulties; and the copy which I had made of it while at Söul, in 1887, from Mr. Foulk's rubbing is not wholly satisfactory. In two places especially characters seem to have been omitted; these I have replaced conjecturally, enclosing them within a line.

Mr. Shuisky, Secretary of the Russian legation at Söul, told me that the Mongol part of the inscription agreed exactly with the Chinese version, and I suppose the Manchu text does also.

(Translation.)

Monument commemorating the benevolence of the Emperor of the Ta-ch'ing dynasty.

In the 1st year Ts'ung-tê of the Ta-ch'ing, in the 12th month in winter (January, 1637), the Emperor Kuan-wen-jen-sheng, being greatly incensed at our wrong doings, marched straight to the Eastern country with his army which none could withstand. Then our Sovereign (寡君) was in (Nam) Han, trembling with fear, as one walking on ice in the spring time awaiting the light of day. In fifty days the troops in the eastern and southern provinces were routed and dispersed, and the armies of the west and north were skulking among the mountains unable to advance a step. In the capital provisions were exhausted. It was then that the army (of the Manchu) occupied the city (as suddenly), as the frosty blast sweeps away the withered autumn leaves or as the brazier's fire consumes a stork's feather. Though

*See *U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1885, p. 326.

this had come to pass, the Emperor put no one to death, but again manifested his benevolence and proclaimed his will, saying: "Come, or else we will utterly destroy you by the sword."

Yō-jō, Ying-ma, and the other generals, having received the imperial commands, made it known through the provinces.

Then our Sovereign assembled his ministers, civil and military, and said to them: "I have been at peace with the great country (大邦) for ten years, but now through my foolishness I have brought on me the punishment of Heaven, and myriads of families have been brought to naught* through the fault of myself alone. Still the Emperor has not allowed executions, and has spoken as above. How can I but obey his command, and perform my duties to my ancestors above and save my people below?"

The Ministers agreeing with this, they followed (the king) several tens on horseback, and coming in front of the (Manchu) army confessed their faults.

The Emperor showed him great courtesy and treated him with kindness. As soon as he saw him his heart went out to him, and his benevolence extended to all even to the accompanying officers. The ceremony being ended, our Sovereign returned to Söul. The Emperor ordered the troops which had gone southward to come back and march westward (to Manchuria). The people's fears were allayed and they went back to their farming, scattering far and near like pheasants going back to their homes. Was not this a great blessing?

Our country (小邦) had done evil, but the superior country for a long time did nothing. Later on the (Korean) general Kang Hong-ip assisted the Ming with troops. They were routed and he was captured. The Emperor T'ai-tsu-wu only kept Hong-ip and some others and sent all the others back.†

Nothing could exceed this clemency, but our country in its ignorance did not comprehend it.

In the year *ting mao* (1627), the Emperor had ordered his generals to subdue our country. Our Prince and his ministers fled to the islands in the sea, and sent an envoy to arrange matters. The Emperor, bearing in mind that (Korea) was a younger brother country (兄弟國), returned the land to (the reigning) family, and moreover sent back Hong-ip.

After the submission (of Korea), relations (between it and Manchuria) were free, and the hats (of both nations were seen) mixing together.

Reckless talk which had fed the fire of discord suddenly made it burst forth. Our government (小邦) reprimanded the

* Lit. myriads of families (were hashed) like fishes' flesh.

† This and the succeeding paragraphs only repeat in detail what is said in the first part of the inscription.

border officers, but its words were not friendly, and its despatches were taken by the high ministers of state (of the Manchus and submitted to the Emperor).* The Emperor in his great clemency pardoned this, and did not at once send his troops. He first proclaimed his orders, stating that he would restore tranquillity with his troops if his orders were not obeyed, for the command which came from his mouth could not possibly be evaded. Our Prince and ministers had no means of concealing their crime.

Then the Emperor with his army surrounded Nan-han, and ordered one of his generals to capture first Kang do (i. e. Kang-hwa island). The queen, the crown prince, and the families of the high officers of the crown were captured (on it). The Emperor gave orders to his officers that no injury should be done them, and sent officials and eunuchs to look after and protect them. Later on, in the abundance of his goodness, he allowed the Prince of our country, his ministers, and the captives whom he had protected to return to their homes. Once more the season of frost and snow had given place to that of bright spring (or of sunshine and spring), the drought had vanished before the rains. The country (國) which had been lost was existing again; the ancestral line (lit. ancestors) from which we had been cut asunder was again tied together. All the thousands of *li* within the Eastern country (i. e. Korea) were regenerated. Since of old, never had such a thing been heard of!

At the place of the Emperor's headquarters, on the altar ground, I the Sovereign have therefore given orders to the Naval board, that the altar be added to and made higher, and that a stone with an inscription be erected thereon, to make known to all future generations that the mercy and virtue of the Emperor is all-pervading like heaven and earth, that on it our country for all future generations will rely, and to the end that the most remote places might reverence the praiseworthy humanity of the great dynasty (of Ta-ch'ing), which has no parallel; for if we consider the expanse of heaven and earth, or the brilliancy of the sun and moon, they cannot compare to one ten thousandth (of its humanity).

Reverently recording its general features, this inscription tells us :†

Heaven sends down the frost and dew,
Bringing cold and bringing life;
So also is the Emperor,
And wide-reaching his majesty and virtue.

* My translation of this paragraph is subject to correction. I have followed the explanations given me by my Chinese *sien-sheng*. Conf. account of these events given page 10.

† The latter part of the inscription, from this line to the end, is in verse.

The Emperor came to the East
 With ten myriads of his men,
 (Like) the rumbling of thunder,
 Like tigers, like bears—
 From the western Fan poor and needy,
 To the region of the North.
 Grasping their halberds they rode before.*
 Glorious is (the Emperor's) energy.†
 The Emperor, in his great mercy,
 Graciously spoke words of kindness.
 All the orders which he spoke
 While awe-inspiring were yet kind.
 When first spoken they were not understood,
 So we brought misery on ourselves.
 Clear were the Emperor's commands ;
 Like one awakening from sleep,
 Our Sovereign was filled with reverence,
 And together with his people he returned (to obedience).
 Not only was it fear (of the Emperor's) might,
 But also confidence in his goodness.
 The Emperor commended him :
 And his kindness was great and vast his graciousness.
 It brought back brightness and smiles,
 And the arms of war were put away.
 What has he given us ?
 Noble steeds and light fur gowns,
 The people of Söul, gentry and women,
 Sing songs and ballads (in his praise).
 Speaking of the army,
 The Emperor sent back home his troops.
 He has brought to life the people,
 And, pitying our dismembered state,
 He has exhorted us to take to our occupations.
 ('T was like) rich colors laid afresh on vessels of gold,‡
 As flesh reappearing on dried bones,
 Or winter vanishing before returning spring.
 There is a great block of stone
 At the head of the great river (大江),
 And for ten thousand years in the land of Ham
 It will be a glorification of the Emperor.

Erected in the 4th year of Ch'ung tê, 12th month, 8th day
 (January, 1640).

The Minister Yö I-ch'i with the title of Ka-san tai-pu, a Vice-President of the 1st class (*Champan*) of the Board of Rites, and Tong-chi-wi-kön Pusa, composed (this) under royal instructions.

The Minister Wo Syun with the title of Cha-hön tai-pu, a Vice-President of the 2d class (*Pan-i*) of the majority of Söul (*Han-cheng pu*), traced the characters under royal instructions.

The Minister Nj Kyöng-shök with the title of Cha-hön tai-pu, President (*Pan-so*) of the Board of Civil Office, and Chancellor of the Academy (*Hong-mun kuan*), Chancellor of the College for literary studies (*Hak-ye-mun kuan*), and Ki-syong Kyun-sa, revised it under royal instructions.

* See *Shih ching*, *Wei shih*, ode *Po-hsi*.

† See *Shih ching*, *Shang-sung*, ode *Yin-wu*.

‡ These two lines in my copy of the text are probably badly copied, as two characters are missing. I have, however, translated in accordance with my copy, omitting the words 玉宇, which are only suggestions.

Songpha Inscription.

大清皇帝功德碑

大清崇德元年冬十有二月

寬溫仁聖皇帝以壞自我始赫然怒以武士臨之直擣而東莫
敢有抗者時我寡君棲于漢凜凜若履春冰而待白日者殆
五旬東南諸道兵相繼崩潰西北師逗撓峽內不能進一步城中
食且盡當此之時以大兵城如霜風之卷秋穽爐火之燎鴻毛而
皇帝不殺為武惟布德是先乃降敕之曰來朕全爾否屠之有若英
馬諸大將承

皇帝相屬于道于是我寡君集文武諸臣謂曰予托和好于大邦十
年于茲矣由予愆惑自速天討萬姓魚肉罪在予一人

皇帝猶不忍戕之諭之如此予曷敢不欽承以上全我宗社下保我生
靈乎大臣協贊之遂從數十騎詣軍前請罪

皇帝乃優之以禮拊之以恩一見而推心腹 錫賚之恩遍及從臣禮罷即
還我寡君于都城立召兵之南下者振旅而西 撫民勸農遠近之雉
烏散者咸復厥居詎非大幸歟小邦之獲罪 上國久已未之役都元師姜
立弘助兵明朝兵敗被擒

太祖武皇帝只弘立等數人餘悉放回 恩莫大焉而小邦迷不知悟丁卯歲今
皇帝命將征本國君臣避入海島遣使成

皇帝久之視為兄弟國強土復宗弘立亦還矣自茲以征禮遇不晉冠蓋交跡
不幸浮議扇惑構成亂梯小邦申飭邊臣言涉不遜而其文為大臣所得
皇帝猶寬貸之不即加兵乃先降明旨諭以師期丁寧反復不翅若耳提
面命而終未免焉小邦君臣之罪益無逃矣

皇帝已以大兵圍南漢而又 命偏師先陷江都宮嬪王子暨卿士家小俱被俘
獲

皇帝戒諸將不得擾害令官及內侍看護既而大需恩典小邦君臣及其被
獲眷屬復歸于舊霜雪變為陽春枯旱轉為時雨區土既亡而復存宗
社已絕而還續環東土數千里咸囿于生成之澤此實古昔簡策所稀
覲也

皇帝駐蹕之所也壇場在焉我寡君爰命水部就壇所增而高大
之又代石以碑之垂諸永久而彰夫

皇帝之功之德直與造化而同流也豈我小邦世世而永賴抑亦
大朝之仁聲武誼無遠不服者未始不茲顧摹天地之大盡日月
之明不足以彷彿其萬一謹將其大畧銘曰

天降霜露載肅載育惟
帝則之並布
威德

皇帝臨東十萬其師殷殷轟轟如虎如貔西蕃窮髮暨夫北落執
殳前驅厥靈赫赫

皇帝孔仁誕降恩言十行昭面既嚴且溫始述不知自貽伊戚

帝有明命如寐之覺我后祗服相率而歸匪惟怛威惟德之依

皇帝嘉之澤洽禮優載色載笑爰束戈矛何以錫之駿馬輕裘

都人士女乃歌乃謳我言軍旅

皇帝班師活我赤子哀我蕩析勸我樵事金甌依翠玉宇維新枯骨
再肉寒發復春有石山魏然大江之頭萬載之韓

皇帝之休

崇德四年十二月初八日 立

嘉善大夫禮曹叅判兼同知義禁府事臣呂爾徵奉教篆

資憲大夫漢城府判尹臣吳俊奉教書

資憲大夫吏曹判書兼弘文館大提學藝文館大提學知成均事臣李景奭奉教撰

VI.

The following document completes the history of Korea's foreign relations, giving as it does an official account of the mode in which treaties with Western powers were concluded, and of the rôle China played in their negotiation.

This paper may invalidate some of the inferences which I have drawn concerning the present relations of Korea and China, but of this I leave my readers to judge. The question is not one into which I care to enter, nor even one which I feel competent to decide; for it cannot be finally judged by our Western rules, and the Asiatic one is to me unknown, since published documents do not explain it sufficiently.

MEMORIAL OF THE KING OF CHÖSEN TO THE EMPEROR OF CHINA IN REFERENCE TO SENDING ENVOYS TO WESTERN COUNTRIES. PUBLISHED IN THE SHIH PAO OF TIENSIN, NOV. 29, 1887.

Your Minister (臣) the King of Chösen, Ni I, respectfully memorializes the Throne in the matter of asking the Imperial consent as a preliminary step to sending envoys to Western countries.

On the 7th day of the 8th month of the present year (23d September, 1887), Shin Wo-chak, Yang-wi-cheng of the Wi-cheng-pu,* reported that he had received a despatch from Yüan Shih-K'ai, (Chinese) Minister resident in Chösen for diplomatic and commercial affairs, stating that orders had reached him from the Grand Secretary of State Li Hung-chang, in which he said: "a telegram from the Tsung-li Yamén has been received containing the following Imperial edict:

"As to Chösen sending envoys to Western countries, it is necessary first to solicit the sanction of the Throne; when this has been granted, envoys may be sent. This is in accordance with the ceremonial usages governing the relations of dependent states (with the Imperial government).

Respectfully received."†

"You will immediately communicate this to the (Korean) government (輔政府), so that it may act accordingly.

"In view of these instructions, he (Yüan Shih-K'ai), as in duty bound, communicated the above to the honorable Council of State, requesting it to consider the subject and to take measures in compliance therewith."

In our humble opinion, this country (小邦) has for genera-

* The Wi-cheng-pu is practically the Council of State of Korea.

† This phrase is usually translated by 'respect this,' but it is really an indorsement put on documents emanating from the Emperor by the secretaries of the grand council after copying them for transmission, and forms no part of the Imperial commands.

tions been the recipient of favors from the Heavenly Court, favors as great and as far reaching as (Heaven and Earth) which cover and support all, and as exalted and profound as the mountains and the sea. There is nothing which His Majesty does not comprehend, and they who seek (his aid) do find it.*

As to the matter of foreign relations, we have received express orders from Your Majesty (皇帝陛下), showing his loving kindness for a border protected state (藩服), and his sedulous care in supporting and directing it. He expressly authorized us to enter into relations of commerce and amity with the United States in the first place, and he deputed an officer to assist in negotiating a satisfactory treaty. Besides this, He had prior to this caused (us) to send a despatch (to the United States) clearly stating that Chōsen was a member (屬邦) of the Chinese Empire, but that as to its internal administration and foreign relations it had always enjoyed independence.†

As in duty bound, this country sedulously attends to the duties devolving upon a prince of the Empire (侯度); but as to questions of equality and reciprocity, and of an international character with foreign nations, it and they enjoy sovereign powers.‡

Later on, other Western powers came in turn (to Korea) and negotiated treaties, all of which were based on that concluded with the United States, which was both satisfactory and just. When they were concluded, the facts were reported to Your Majesty and received your approval.

After the exchange of ratifications of the American treaty, a minister plenipotentiary was sent in accordance with its provisions to reside at Sōul, and this country sent an envoy (to the United States) bearing messages of good will, and he (in due course) returned.

But as to sending congratulatory messages to the other (treaty) powers, it was not possible to do so; hence the repeated requests of the envoys of the different (treaty) powers to have us send envoys to reside in their countries.

This country, while having present to its mind the urgency of the occasion was yet desirous of complying with the terms of the treaties, so I have recently appointed my minister §

* Lit., "where there is seeking there is finding." The phrase is in constant use, and may be seen on every wall and in every temple in China, as an expression of belief in the mercy of the gods and an acknowledgment of favors received from them.

† A letter, the contents of which are as herein stated, has been addressed by the Korean government to every power which has concluded a treaty with it. Compare the remark of the Emperor Tai-tsu of the Ming, quoted p. 4: "Kao-li is not under the rule of the Middle Kingdom."

‡ Literally, 'both complete,' 'both with full powers.'

§ The King, speaking of himself as the Emperor's Minister (臣) must needs call his own ministers *p'ei ch'en*, 'subordinate minister.' This

Pak Chông-yong to be a Minister plenipotentiary, and propose sending him to reside in the United States. I have moreover appointed my minister Cho Chyen-li to be a Minister plenipotentiary, proposing to send him to the five realms of England, France, Germany, Italy and Russia, there to reside for the transaction of international questions.

I now, as in duty bound, submit these facts to Your Majesty, and beg that as an extra act of grace you will deign to sanction the sending of these envoys, to the end that the question of envoys may be settled in accordance with treaties.

Your memorialist has moreover to remark that, in accordance with established regulations when questions arise concerning the presentation of tribute and ceremonial (audiences), he writes (咨)* to the Board of Ceremonies, who in turn present the subject to Your Majesty, while international matters are submitted to Your Majesty by the Prince and Ministers of the Foreign office or the superintendent of northern trade, the Minister of State Li Hung-chang. Except in matters of exceptional gravity, he would not venture to address directly Your Majesty; but in the present case after having listened on bended knee and with unutterable awe and trembling to Your Majesty's telegraphic commands, he ventures, in utter disregard of all sense of propriety, to state unequivocally his innermost thoughts; and he awaits in trepidation the Imperial reply to his request that, as a preliminary step to sending envoys to Western countries, Your Majesty's sanction be obtained, which is hereby respectfully solicited.

is not, however, a peculiarity of this document; it occurs throughout the *Ta-ch'ing hui tien*, where all envoys from the King of Korea are thus styled.

* *Tzu* is used in speaking of correspondence between persons of equal rank.